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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
In its 1992 session, the United States Supreme Court decided seven
cases originating from the Tenth Circuit.' This survey discusses two
cases, United States v. Williams and United States v. Felix, involving impor-
tant sections of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution that will have
direct impacts on prosecutorial actions and defendants' Fifth Amend-
ment protections. Both decisions make it easier for prosecutors to bring
suspects to trial. In Williams, the Supreme Court negated the Tenth Cir-
cuit's requirement that prosecutors present possible exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury.2 In Felix, the Court, again reversing the Tenth
Circuit, held (1) that admission of evidence of a crime at one trial does
not bar subsequent prosecution of that crime3 and (2) that conspiracy to
commit a crime and the actual crime itself are separate offenses for
double jeopardy purposes.
4
I. UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS: AN OTHERWISE VALID INDICTMENT MAY
NOT BE DISMISSED SOLELY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT DID
NOT PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE
GRAND JURY
A. Introduction
The grand jury was first established in the 12th century by King
Henry II, to give him a means to enforce his dealings with the state and
to gain greater control over the administration ofjustice. 5 However, the
idea of the grand jury as a protector did not develop until the late 17th
century, when King Charles II tried to use the grand jury to indict the
Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge for treason. These two men
were well-known Protestants who were, with popular support, trying to
1. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992); Barnhill v.Johnson, 112 S. Ct.
1386 (1992); United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) [Felix II]; McCarthy v. Madigan,
112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); United States v. lbarra, 112 S. Ct. 4 (1991). For a discussion of
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, a landmark water pollution law case, see Cynthia McNeill, Comment,
The States Square off in Arkansas v. Oklahoma: And the Winner Is... the EPA, 70 DENY. U. L.
REV. - (1993).
2. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
3. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1382. References to the Tenth Circuit disposition of this
case, United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992),
are also Felix II. References to United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) are
Felix I.
4. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1383.
5. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTrrU-
TION ON TRIAL 6-7 (1977); Douglas P. Currier, Note, The Exercise of Superuisory Powers to
Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIo ST. L.J.
1077, 1078 (1984).
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prevent the King from reestablishing the Catholic Church in England.
The grand jury refused to act under the King's orders and did not issue
an indictment. 6 English colonists brought the concept of the grand jury
to the new world. The framers of the Constitution incorporated it into
the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, 7 intending that the grand
jury should act as a shield against improper indictment. 8 Today, how-
ever, the grand jury acts as both a shield and a sword. 9 In the criminal
justice system, the function of the grand jury is to issue indictments.'
°
This function has become a powerful tool in the hands of prosecutors, a
tool that has great potential for abuse because of lack of control by the
courts over prosecutors' actions. I The lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court have shown little propensity to permit judicial supervi-
sion of grand jury proceedings, fearing the generation of collateral pro-
ceedings and disruptive delaying tactics by the defense. 12 For instance,
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,13 the Court held that federal courts
may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings ab-
sent a showing of prejudice to the defendant. 14 In United States v. Wil-
liams, the Court decided only the narrow question of whether
prosecutors should present exculpatory evidence to grand juries, hold-
ing that there was no duty for prosecutors to do this.' 5 However, the
broader effect of Williams will be to functionally negate the entire idea of
judicial supervision. 6
B. Facts
John H. Williams, Jr. was an investor and businessman in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.' 7 Between September 1984 and November 1985, Williams
obtained loans and loan renewals from four banks in Tulsa. With each
request for a loan or renewal, Williams provided the banks with two
6. FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 5, at 9; Currier, supra note 5, at 1078.
7. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Anne Bowen Poulin, Supervision of the Grand Jury: Who Watches the Guardian?, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 885 (1990).
9. Id. at 885-86.
10. Currier, supra note 5, at 1078.
11. Poulin, supra note 8, at 886-87; Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and
the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463,
549-54, 565-69 (1980).
12. Poulin, supra note 8, at 887-89.
13. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
14. Id at 263. Cf. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989)
(defendant may not appeal trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for
alleged violation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71 (1986) (a postconviction appeal of a violation of Rule 6(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must be reviewed under a harmless-error stan-
dard); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (no dismissal of indictment
based on illegally seized evidence because accused may challenge evidence at trial); Cos-
tello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (no dismissal of indictment based solely on
hearsay evidence). See generally Poulin, supra note 8; Currier, supra note 5.
15. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992).
16. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
17. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
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types of financial statements: a "Market Value Balance Sheet" and a
"Statement of Projected Income and Expenses."' 8
The "Market Value Balance Sheet" contained a category labeled
"Current Assets."' 9 Williams included as current assets $5 million to $6
million in notes receivable from three venture capital companies in
which he had invested. Each of the companies had a negative net worth
.at the time. However, Williams' financial statements carried a disclaimer
that these assets were carried at cost rather than at market value.2 0 The
second type of financial statement, the "Statement of Projected Income
and Expense," listed as a source of income the interest income payable
on these notes receivable. However, it did not indicate that these inter-
est payments were entirely funded by Williams' own loans to the venture
capital companies.
2'
In May 1988, after a six-month investigation, a federal grand jury
indicted Williams on seven counts of knowingly making false statements
or reports for the purpose of influencing the actions of a federally in-
sured financial institution, 22 in violation of the Crimes and Criminal
Procedures Act.23 The indictment accused Williams of supplying the
banks with "materially false" statements that willfully overvalued his
current assets and interest income.
24
Shortly after his arraignment, Williams filed a motion to compel the
government to disclose any evidence that tended to exculpate him.
2 5
The government indicated that it would comply with its duty under
Brady v. Maryland26 to provide exculpatory evidence, but failed to do so.
The district court then ordered the government to provide any exculpa-
tory material. The government agreed to provide Williams with edited
portions of the grand jury transcripts and to provide the unedited tran-
script to the court.
2 7
After reviewing this material, Williams filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment, claiming that the government failed to present substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, citing prior Tenth Circuit prece-
dent in United States v. Page.28 In Page, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
rule that prosecutors must reveal to the grand jury substantial exculpa-
18. Id.
19. The label "current assets" describes assets that will be realized in cash within one
year. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1735
(1992).
20. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
21. Williams, 898 F.2d at 899.
22. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
24. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
25. Id.
26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.'83, 87 (1963) (requiring the government to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused when the evidence is material to either guilt or
punishment).
27. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
28. 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987) (holding that when
substantial exculpatory evidence is discovered during an investigation, it must be revealed
to the grand jury).
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tory evidence discovered during an investigation, or risk dismissal of the
indictment. 29 The rationale for adopting this rule was the promotion of.
judicial economy. The Tenth Circuit, in adopting this rule, chose to fol-
low decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits3 0 rather than decisions
of the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits which held that prosecutors need
not present exculpatory evidence. 3 1 Williams argued that his financial.
records (consisting of ledgers, tax returns and financial statements) and
his deposition from a contemporaneous Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding showed that his methods of accounting and financial reporting
were consistent with the financial statements he had provided to the
banks.3 2 This evidence of consistency, Williams argued, this "exculpa-
tory evidence," would have exonerated him. The district court denied
the motion to dismiss the indictment.
33
Williams then entered a motion to reconsider this dismissal. Upon
reconsideration, the district court dismissed the grand jury indictment
without prejudice. The court found that the evidence " 'raises reason-
able doubt about the defendant's intent to defraud' ,,34 and that the lack
of this evidence "rendered the grand jury's indictment 'gravely
suspect.' -35
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the gov-
ernment had presented all the necessary evidence required under Page.
The government argued that "under its theory" of the case (that Wil-
liams intended to influence the banks' actions), the government had
presented "all relevant evidence" to the grand jury.3 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit thoroughly discussed the district court's findings with respect to this
contention. In first reviewing the district court's findings under a
"clearly erroneous" standard,3 7 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
district court's choice among more than one permissible view of the evi-
dence could not be clearly erroneous. 38 The Tenth Circuit then re-
viewed the materials on which Williams based his argument that the
government should have presented exculpatory material to the grand
jury. These materials consisted of Williams' financial records and his
29. Id.
30. Unites States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1068 (1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193
(1985); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Civella, 666 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981).
32. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737-38.
33. Williams, 899 F.2d at 900.
34. Id. (quoting the District Judge's Order).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 901.
37. Id. at 900. See United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that the rule of civil procedure that questions of fact are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard may be applied to certain issues in criminal proceedings).
38. Williams, 899 F.2d at 900 (citing Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 851
F.2d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1988)).
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deposition given in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's goal was to determine whether the government should have
presented this material to the grand jury as part of proving one of the
essential elements of its case-whether Williams intended to influence
the banks' action by use of false statements.
39
The Tenth Circuit followed the district court in separating the ques-
tionable evidence into two categories: (1) the bankruptcy deposition and
(2) the financial statements and tax records prepared by Williams and
his accounting firm.40 The Tenth Circuit found that although the state-
ments Williams made in his bankruptcy depositions were "irrelevant and
self-serving" under the government's theory of the case, they were not
necessarily so under a different theory that the grand jury could have
reasonably adopted. 4 1 Because there could be more than one view of
this evidence, the district court's finding that the deposition contained
exculpatory evidence was not clearly erroneous. 4 2 After examining the
financial statements, the Tenth Circuit found that a grand jury could
reasonably conclude that Williams had a different understanding of
"current assets" than the government or the banks and that because of
these different meanings, Williams did not intend to mislead the banks.
The government urged the court to review the grand jury transcript,
arguing that this evidence was presented to the grand jury by the testi-
mony of its witnesses. The Tenth Circuit was unable to review the grand
jury transcript, however, because the government did not designate it as
part of the record. 43 The court was therefore forced to conclude that
the district court's finding that the government withheld exculpatory ev-
idence was not clearly erroneous.
4 4
The Tenth Circuit then briefly discussed whether Williams was
prejudiced by the failure of the government to present the exculpatory
evidence and whether the district court abused its discretion by dis-
missing the indictment. The court found that by withholding the excul-
patory evidence, the government " 'substantially influence[d]' " the
grand jury's decision to indict, or at least raised a " 'grave doubt that the
decision to indict was free from such substantial influence.' 45 This
met the Bank of Nova Scotia standard for errors that prejudice the defend-
ant: whether the violations substantially influenced the grand jury's de-
cision to indict.4 6 These circumstances were sufficient for the Tenth
Circuit to find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis-
missing the indictment.
4 7
39. Id. at 901.
40. Id. at 901-03.
41. Id. at 902.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 903.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 903 (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263
(1988)).
46. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263.
47. Williams, 899 F.2d at 904.
1993]
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D. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the 5-4 opinion for the Supreme Court revers-
ing the Tenth Circuit decision. The opinion held that district courts
may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the government
failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
4 8
The holding extended a line of cases confirming the Court's reluctance
to challenge the validity of grand jury indictments and curtailing judicial
supervision of grand juries.
49
The Court considered two issues: (1) whether certiorari had been
properly granted and (2) whether prosecutors should present exculpa-
tory evidence to grand juries. The Court first considered whether it
properly granted certiorari, since the government (the petitioner) did
not previously argue that Page was wrongly decided. Traditionally, a
question not "pressed or passed upon below" is not reviewed by the
Supreme Court.50 This rule ensures the development of the factual rec-
ord and gives the Justices the full benefit of competing arguments.5 1
Justice Scalia determined, however, that the Tenth Circuit had indeed
"passed on" the prosecutor's obligation to tell the grand jury about ex-
culpatory evidence in its decision in United States v. Williams. 52 Two pre-
vious cases established that an issue not pressed could be reviewed so
long as it had been passed upon.5 3 Justice Scalia then stated a new rule
to permit the Supreme Court to review a question even though it was
not contested below:
It is a permissible exercise of our discretion to undertake re-
view of an important issue expressly decided by a federal court
where, although the petitioner did not contest the issue in the
case immediately at hand, it did so as a party to the recent pro-
ceeding upon which the lower courts relied for their resolution
of the issue, and did not concede in the current case the cor-
rectness of that precedent5 4
The Court next considered the substantive issue: whether a district
court may dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the govern-
ment failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. Justice Scalia first considered whether the supervisory power of
the federal courts extends to the grand jury. The federal courts possess
the authority to establish procedural rules not specifically required by
the Constitution or the Congress, 5 5 but Justice Scalia found that this
48. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992).
49. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
50. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1738.
51. David 0. Stewart, Advantage Government: Is It Easier for the Government to Win in the
Supreme Court?, 78 A.B.A. J. 46 (1992).
52. 112 S. Ct. at 1740 n.4; See Williams, 899 F.2d at 900.
53. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (1991); Stevens v.
Department of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1991).
54. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1740-41 (footnote omitted).
55. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
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authority applies only to the court's power to control its own proce-
dures. 56 Even though Bank of Nova Scotia made it clear that this supervi-
sory power could be used to dismiss an indictment because of
misconduct before the grand jury,57 this power only applies to miscon-
duct that violates "clear rules .. . drafted .. .by this Court and by
Congress." 58 Stressing the grand jury's "operational separateness"
from the courts, 59 Scalia held that the supervisory power of the courts
cannot be used to prescribe prosecutorial misconduct before a grand
jury.6 0
Justice Scalia then considered whether Fifth Amendment "common
law" justified the Tenth Circuit's ruling in order to preserve the effec-
tiveness of the grand jury's constitutional role as an " 'independent and
informed' " body.6 ' He concluded that "requiring the prosecutor to
present exculpatory ... evidence would alter the grand jury's historical
role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body." 62 For
a balanced presentation to be made in this situation, the person under
investigation should be the one to present such evidence, not the prose-
cutor; yet this conflicts with more than 200 years of grand jury prac-
tice.63 Also, the grand jury itself can decide not to hear more evidence
when it believes it has enough to bring an indictment, even though the
prosecutor offers more. If the grand jury is not required to hear excul-
patory evidence, the prosecutor should not be obliged to present it.
64
The Court concluded that a prosecutor has no duty to present exculpa-
tory evidence to a grand jury, reversing the Tenth Circuit.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, sharply differed with both
holdings of the majority. In arguing that certiorari should have been
denied, Justice Stevens said that the Tenth Circuit did not "pass upon"
Page in its opinion; it simply restated Page and applied it as settled law.
65
In addition, the government not only failed to challenge Page in the
Tenth Circuit case, but actually urged the court to follow Page's holding
and find that the evidence was not exculpatory. 66 The government did
not actually challenge Page until it petitioned the Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari. The majority's holding that the Supreme Court can grant certio-
rari in such circumstances, Justice Stevens concluded, may result in a
significantly expanded caseload. 67 More important, it gives an unfair
56. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
57. Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988)).
58. Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986)).
59. Id. at 1743.
60. Id. at 1742.
61. Id. at 1744 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1744-45.
64. Id. at 1745.
65. Id. at 1747-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 1747.
67. Id. at 1748.
1993]
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advantage to the United States because the United States is the most
frequent litigant in federal courts. This advantage, warned Justice Ste-
vens, will compromise the Court's duty to act impartially. 68
Justice Stevens also objected to the majority's substantive holding.
Unlike the majority, the dissent maintained that the courts have the
power to supervise grand juries. The dissent found considerable sup-
port for the idea that the grand jury, although independent, is and has
always been subject to the control of the Court.69 The dissent also
found previous recognition by the Supreme Court of its authority to cre-
ate and enforce limited rules applicable to grand jury proceedings, even
though the Court has declined exercise this authority. 70 The applica-
tion of this supervisory power is necessary to curb prosecutorial miscon-
duct, which is varied and not infrequent. 7 1 Justice Stevens considered
this conduct intolerable because the prosecutor represents a sovereign
that is obliged to govern impartially.7 2 Justice Stevens advocated adopt-
ing the standard of the United States Department of Justice. This stan-
dard holds that "when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is
personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt
of a subject of an investigation, the prosecutor must present or other-
wise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an
indictment."
73
E. Analysis and Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Tenth Circuit, extended its
reluctance to question the validity of grand jury indictments. In effect,
the language of the decision foreclosed any meaningful judicial supervi-
sion of the grand jury in any context, not just that of an incomplete
presentation of evidence. By stressing the traditional independence of
the grand jury from the courts, 74 and by affirming that the procedural
rules formulated by courts apply only to the courts' own procedures, 75
68. Id. at 1748-49.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974); Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled on separatepoint by Harris v. United States, 382 U.S.
162, 167 (1965); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283 (1919); Falter v. United States,
23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590 (1928).
70. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988); Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 343; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor
failing to inform grand jury of its authority to subpoena witnesses); United States v.
Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor presenting perjured testimony);
United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 162 nn.6-7 (D. Md. 1980) (prosecutor misstat-
ing the facts on cross-examination of a witness); United States v. Roberts, 481 F. Supp.
1385, 1389 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (prosecutor misstating the law); United States v. Gold,
470 F. Supp. 1336, 1346-51 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (prosecutor operating under a conflict of
interest); United States v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 615-17 (N.D. Okla.
1977) (prosecutors failing to inform grand jury of exculpatory evidence obtained from a
witness questioned outside the grand jury).
72. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 11, 9-
11.233 (1988) (amended 1990).
74. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743.
75. Id. at 1741.
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the Supreme Court cut the grand jury loose from any hobbles applied by
the lower courts. A grand jury indictment may be dismissed only when
the prosecutor violates a constitutional or statutory restriction. 76 At
bottom, the Court fears that greater supervision 77 will lead to collateral
proceedings and disruptive delaying tactics by the defense, consuming
"valuable judicial time" 78 and "run[ning] counter to the whole history
of the grand jury institution."' 79 The grand jury, moving far from its
traditional role as an accusatory body, will become an adjudicatory
force. Criminal investigations will be impeded.8 0
As a practical matter, prosecutors will find it even easier to convince
the grand jury to indict. Defendants, having lost the protection given by
Page and similar decisions,8 ' can depend only on other rules that may
influence prosecutors, such as the rule of the Department of justice that
requires United States attorneys to disclose substantial exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury or face reprimands.8 2 Justice Scalia accepted
the government's argument that such rules would indeed act to curb
overzealous prosecutors.8 3 It remains to be seen whether Congress will
agree with the Court's decision, or find it necessary to enact statutory
restrictions governing prosecutors' failure to present exculpatory evi-
dence to grand juries.
8 4
II. UNITED STATES V. FELIX: ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF A CRIME Is
NOT THE SAME AS PROSECUTION OF THAT CRIME AND DOES NOT
ESTABLISH A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION; SUBSTANTIVE CRIME AND
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THAT CRIME ARE NOT THE SAME OFFENSE FOR
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES
A. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment states in part: "No person shall ... be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
.... -85 It is unfortunate that a concept so basic8 6 and with so long a
history8 7 should have become such a quagmire in modern jurispru-
76. Id. See also Steven A. Shaw, It's "No Holds Barred' in the Grand Jury Room, TEx. LAW.,
July 13, 1992, at 10.
77. See Poulin, supra note 8; Currier, supra note 5.
78. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746.
79. Id. at 1744.
80. See Arenella, supra note i1, at 566-67 (discussing the ramifications of requiring
prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence).
81. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. SeeJustices Hear Debate on Government Duty to Give GrandJury Exculpatory Evidence, 60
U.S.L.W. 1128 (1992) (summarizing the government's argument before the Supreme
Court).
84. For a discussion on this point, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., End the Grand Jury Charade,
AM. LAW., June 1992, at 32.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the double
jeopardy clause; thus, its prohibitions apply to state prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
86. Eli J. Richardson, Matching Tests for DoubleJeopardy Violations with Constitutional Inter-
ests, 45 VAND. L. REV. 273, 274 (1992).
87. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting)
19931 915
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dence.88 The sticking point is the phrase "same offence." Courts in
literally thousands of decisions8 9 have struggled to define this phrase.
The Supreme Court has struggled in the same way and to much the
same result. United States v. Felix9 ° represents the Court's most recent
attempt to clarify a very small piece of this very large fogbank.
The basic functions of the double jeopardy clause are at least clear.
Double jeopardy protects defendants in four ways: (1) it provides final-
ity; (2) it prevents prosecutorial harassment; (3) it preserves the jury's
prerogatives to resolve factual issues; and (4) it bars successive prosecu-
tions (resulting from several proceedings) and multiple punishments
(resulting from one proceeding). 9 1 Discussions of "same offense"
sprang from the constitutional bar against successive prosecutions and
multiple punishments. Blockburger v. United States9 2 enunciated the first
test of whether double jeopardy exists in the context of multiple punish-
ments. This test, however, was later seen to be insufficient for the analy-
sis of successive prosecutions. 93 Two recent cases, Dowling v. United
States 94 and Grady v. Corbin,9 5 attempted to clarify the steps to be taken
in analyzing this problem by adopting conduct-based standards. Grady,
however, marked a break from the Court's earlier double jeopardy juris-
prudence 9 6 and cannot be reconciled with the Dowling decision, because
evidence ruled admissible in Dowling would be barred by Grady.9 7 Also,
the lower courts have applied the Grady standard inconsistently,9 8 or
have failed to apply it in the manner the Supreme Court envisioned. 99
(explaining that the guarantee against double jeopardy dates back to the days of Demos-
thenes, who stated that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same is-
sue") (quoting 1 Demosthenes 589 (J. Vance trans., 4th ed. 1970)). See generally George C.
Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition,
71 IowA L. REV. 323, 325 (1986) (noting that the law of double jeopardy dates back to
ancient Greek, Hebrew and Roman law).
88. Justice Rehnquist has described law in the double jeopardy area as "a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator," Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981), and as a "Gordian knot," Whalen, 445
U.S. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
89. Thomas, supra note 87, at 330.
90. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) [Felix II].
91. Tat Man J. So, Double Jeopardy, Complex Crimes and Grady v. Corbin, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 351, 352 (1991).
92. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger established the standard that where the same act
may violate two different statutes, the two statutory offenses are not the same if each re-
quires proof of a fact that the other does not. Id. at 304.
93. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2092 (1990).
94. 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (admission. of testimony from a previous prosecution in
which defendant was acquitted does not violate the collateral-estoppel component of the
double jeopardy clause).
95. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). "[T]he Double jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prose-
cution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the
Government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." Id. at 2087.
96. Id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 n.2 (1992) [Felix II].
99. Id. at 1382 ("we think that this is an extravagant reading of Grady"); id. at 1384
("we decline to read the language so expansively ... because of difficulties which have
already arisen in [Grady's] interpretation.").
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For instance, the Second and Tenth Circuits bar conspiracy prosecu-
tions if the defendant has already been prosecuted for the substantive
offenses supporting the conspiracy charge, while the First and Fourth
Circuits allow such prosecutions. 10 0 The Court used Felix both to clarify
the meaning of Grady and to reconcile it with Dowling.
B. Facts
Sometime in the spring of 1987, a meeting between Frank Dennis
Felix and unindicted co-conspirator Paul Roach resulted in an agree-
ment that Felix would supply Roach with financing, chemicals and
equipment in exchange for Roach's instructions on how to manufacture
("cook") methamphetamine. 1° 1 Felix then bought the chemicals and
equipment needed from George Dwinnells, a United States Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) confidential informant, who sold
chemicals and equipment to Felix on a number of occasions. 10 2 Felix
told Dwinnells he was trying to make "dope."' 0 3 In May 1987, Roach
and Felix set up a methamphetamine laboratory in a trailer parked on an
oil lease near Beggs, Oklahoma, in which they manufactured
methamphetamine four to six times'04 from June 1 to July 13, 1987.105
Felix paid Roach $4000 for Roach's part of the laboratory work.
On July 13, 1987, DEA officials seized the unattended Beggs trailer
while a "cook" was in progress. 10 6 They seized methamphetamine oil,
illegal precursor chemicals, manufacturing equipment and other evi-
dence, some of which inculpated Felix.' 0 7 Felix himself escaped capture
in a time-honored way-he hid in the woods.10 8
Shortly thereafter, Felix telephoned Dwinnells and arranged a
meeting at a Tulsa, Oklahoma, bar. 10 9 At this meeting on August 26,
1987, Felix gave Dwinnells a matchbook cover with a list of chemicals
and equipment for making methamphetamine. Felix also gave Dwin-
100. The Second Circuit barred conspiracy prosecutions when the defendant had pre-
viously been prosecuted for a conspiracy where the actions entirely encompassed the ac-
tions of the second conspiracy. United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990).
Later, the Second Circuit held that a conspiracy prosecution is barred if overt acts support-
ing the conspiracy charge involve substantive offenses for which the defendant has already
been prosecuted. United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 54 (1992). The Tenth Circuit followed the Gambino reasoning in its decision in Felix
11, 926 F.2d 1522 (1991).
In contrast, the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have come to the opposite conclu-
sion, that subsequent conspiracy prosecutions are not barred. United States v. Rivera-Feli-
ciano, 930 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1676 (1992); United States v.
Clark, 928 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991).
101. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1377
(1992) [Felix 11]. Roach later became a government witness at Felix's trial.
102. United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) [Felix I].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Felix IH, 926 F.2d at 1524 n.l.
106. Id. at 1524.
107. Id. A car owned by Felix was seized at the laboratory. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070
n.3.
108. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070.
109. Felix 11, 926 F.2d at 1524.
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nells a down payment of $7500, told him to get a trailer to transport the
items and gave him directions and a phone number so the items could
be delivered."I0 DEA agents observed this meeting."I ' In a later tele-
phone conversation, Felix told Dwinnells to deliver the items to the Jop-
lin, Missouri, Holiday Inn; Dwinnells informed the DEA of this
arrangement. 112
The DEA arranged a controlled delivery to be made by Dwinnells in
Joplin on August 31, 1987, with DEA agents and the Missouri Highway
Patrol providing surveillance. Dwinnells drove his vehicle from Tulsa to
Joplin with the trailer attached. Felix met Dwinnells at the Joplin Holi-
day Inn, where Felix, after checking the trailer's contents, attached new
locks to its rear doors and hitched it to his car. The DEA arrested Felix
shortly thereafter.' 13
C. The Federal District Court Decisions
1. The Missouri District Court
On September 15, 1987, a federal grand jury indicted Felix in Mis-
souri and charged him with one count of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine between August 26 and 31, 1987,114 in violation of
the Controlled Substances Act. 1 5 Felix's defense was that he never had
criminal intent, but believed that he was working in a covert operation
for the DEA. 1 16 To support its case that Felix had the requisite intent,
the government introduced the evidence of Felix's earlier activities in
Oklahoma 117 under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 1 18 In his instruc-
tions to the jury, District Judge Russell G. Clark carefully cautioned the
jury that this evidence should be considered only to determine Felix's
state of mind with respect to his Missouri activities, not to determine his
guilt with respect to that evidence. 1 9 The judge's instructions were in
accordance with the Eighth Circuit's relevant pattern instruction.
120
110. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070.
111. Felix!1, 926 F.2d at 1524.
112. Id. at 1525.
113. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070-71. Felix did not tell the arresting officers at this time that
he was working as a covert operator for the DEA, even though he used this as a defense at
trial. Id. at 1071.
114. Id.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988) and Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970) (cur-
rent version at 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988)). Section 841 (a) provides: "Except as authorized by
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally" (1) to man-
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, a controlled substance ...."
Section 846, since amended, provided: "Any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
116. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1074.
117. See supra notes 10 1-07 and accompanying text.
118. "Evidence of prior acts is admissible to show 'motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' " Felix H, 112 S. Ct.
at 1380 (quoting FED. R. Evin. 404(b)).
119. Felix I, 867 F.2d at 1075.
120. Id.
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The jury convicted Felix, and he was fined and sentenced to seven years
in prison. 12 1 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. 
1 22
2. The Oklahoma District Court
On February 16, 1989, the government charged Felix in Oklahoma
with violations of the Controlled Substances Act and named him in eight
counts of an eleven-count indictment. 123 Count 1 charged Felix and
others with conspiring from about May 1, 1987, to August 31, 1987, to
manufacture methamphetamine. Two of the overt acts supporting this
charge were based on conduct that was the subject of the Missouri pros-
ecution.1 24 Counts 2 through 6 charged Felix with substantive crimes
(manufacturing methamphetamine and phenylacetone, possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and maintaining a place for
manufacturing methamphetamine), and Counts 9 and 10 charged Felix
with interstate travel with intent to promote the manufacture of
methamphetamine. 1
25
Before the April, 1989, trial, Felix moved to dismiss the indictment
on double jeopardy grounds.' 2 6 The trial court denied this motion. Fe-
lix was then convicted on all counts after a jury trial.'
2 7
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Felix raised only one issue: that the
Oklahoma district court trial subjected him to double jeopardy because
the evidence introduced at the Oklahoma trial was identical to that used
to prosecute him in the Missouri trial. The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion
written by William J. Holloway, Jr., Chief Judge, agreed, affirming in
part and reversing in part.'
2 8
The Tenth Circuit began by determining that Grady v. Corbin applied
in this situation.' 29 Grady held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already
121. Id. at 1070.
122. Id.
123. Felix H, 926 F.2d at 1524 (10th Cir. 1991). See supra note 115 for the text of the
Controlled Substances Act.
124. Overt act 17 charged that "loin August 26, 1987, Frank Dennis Felix, while in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, provided money for the purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary
in the manufacture of methamphetamine." Overt act 18 charged that "[oln August 31,
1987, Frank Dennis Felix, while at a location in Missouri, possessed chemicals and equip-
ment necessary in the manufacture of methamphetamine." Felix I1, 112 S. Ct. at 1380.
125. Felix 11, 926 F.2d at 1524 n.l.
126. Id. at 1525.
127. Id. at 1524.
128. Id. at 1531.
129. Id. at 1528.
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been prosecuted." 13 0 In a Grady analysis, the focus is on the defendant's
conduct, not on the evidence the government uses to prove that con-
duct. The Tenth Circuit, applying this standard to the counts listed in
the Oklahoma district court indictment,' 3 ' found that for Counts 1
through 6, the duplication of the conduct proved in the Missouri trial
and the Oklahoma trial was extensive; thus, the counts could not
stand.' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit's opinion actually expanded the protec-
tions given by Grady by holding that presenting evidence at one trial bars
a subsequent prosecution on other charges using the same evidence.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Tenth CircuitJudge Stephen H. Anderson wrote a vigorous dissent.
The majority, he wrote, expanded Grady far beyond the interpretation
intended by the Supreme Court, even "dangerously" beyond. 133 The
dissent claimed that the majority ignored the plain meaning of Grady.
The majority interpreted Grady to establish a "same conduct" test. But
in Grady, the dissent pointed out, "conduct" meant only that conduct
"that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted."' 134 The majority failed to analyze Felix's conduct in this
way. In addition, the majority confused "conduct" with "evidence."
Although the majority said it was applying a same conduct test, it pro-
ceeded to analyze, not the conduct proved, but the evidence presented at
each trial. Grady explicitly made a distinction between previously prose-
cuted conduct and evidence used to prove that conduct.'
3 5
The dissent also warned that the majority's interpretation "eviscer-
ates" Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because, by the majority's analy-
sis, introduction of Rule 404(b) prior bad act evidence to prove intent is
the same as prosecution for that bad act. Thus, Rule 404(b) evidence
could never be used when the defendant had already been prosecuted
for that bad act, nor could this evidence, once used, be used in the same
way in another trial.' 3 6 The Supreme Court never intended that Grady
should be interpreted in this way.1
3 7
E. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court moved decisively in a unanimous decision to
130. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
131. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
132. Felix II, 926 F.2d at 1529-31. Counts 9 and 10, charging interstate travel to pro-
mote the manufacture of methamphetamine, did not prove the same conduct as the Mis-
souri trial, and Felix's convictions of these counts were affirmed. Id. at 1531.
133. Id. at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1533 (citing Grady, 495 U.S. at 521).
136. Id. at 1534.
137. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically said in Grady that "the presentation of spe-
cific evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the government from introducing that
same evidence in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 1534 n.5 (quoting Grady, 495 U.S. at
521-22 (1990)).
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quash the Tenth Circuit's expansion of the Grady test' 3 8 and to clear up
a difference in the circuits on the application of Grady to conspiracy
prosecutions.' 3 9 The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, first considered whether the Tenth Circuit had erred in over-
turning Felix's convictions on substantive Counts 2 through 6140 on the
basis that he was prosecuted for the same conduct in both the Missouri
trial and the Oklahoma trial. The Court determined that there was no
common conduct linking the crimes for which Felix was prosecuted in
Oklahoma and Missouri. 14 1 Even though evidence of the Oklahoma
conduct was introduced at the Missouri trial, Felix was never prosecuted
in Missouri for any crimes other than those he committed in Missouri.
The Tenth Circuit was mistaken in making the assumption that offering
evidence of one crime in a trial for another crime barred a subsequent
prosecution for the former crime. 1 4 2 Dowling v. United States 143 implied
that the introduction of evidence of misconduct is not the same as prose-
cution for that misconduct, and Grady v. Corbin endorsed this princi-
ple. ' 4 4 The Court specifically declined to accept a rule that admission of
evidence under Rule 404(b) constituted prosecution of that crime
14 5
and stated that such an interpretation of Grady was "extravagant."'1
46
The Court then considered whether the Double Jeopardy clause
barred Count 1 of the Oklahoma indictment, the conspiracy charge.
The various circuits interpreted Grady differently with respect to conspir-
acy charges, 14 7 and Rehnquist conceded that the Grady language 148 cast
some doubt on Felix's conspiracy conviction when taken out of context
and read literally.' 49 But previous decisions of the Supreme Court are
at odds with Grady and its interpretation that conspiracy prosecutions
are barred by the Double Jeopardy clause. These decisions determined
that a conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself are distinct
and that, for double jeopardy purposes, the offenses are separate.
150
The Felix Court chose to follow this established line of cases rather than
use Grady to determine whether double jeopardy applies. Thus, Felix
establishes that the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution of
a conspiracy when the defendant has already been convicted of the sub-
stantive crimes that resulted from the conspiracy.
138. Felix II, 112 S. Ct. at 1381.
139. See id. at 1381 n.2.
140. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
141. Felix I, 112 S. Ct. at 1382.
142. Id.
143. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145. Felix!!, 112 S. Ct. at 1383 n.3.
146. Id. at 1382.
147. See supra note 100.
148. See supra text accompanying note 130.
149. Felix!!, 112 S. Ct. at 1383.
150. E.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947) ("the agreement to do the
act is distinct from the act itself"); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (a
"substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses ...
[aind the plea of double jeopardy is no defense").
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F. Analysis and Conclusion
In reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court firmly put to rest
any attempts to expand Grady beyond its facts and established a small bit
of solid ground in the murky world of double jeopardy analysis. The
Court closely followed Judge Anderson's analysis in the Tenth Circuit
dissenting opinion. 15 1 The Court preserved the use of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) 15 2 by holding that overlapping proof does not establish
a double jeopardy violation.' 5 3 The Court's holding resolved conflict-
ing circuit decisions on the use of Grady in conspiracy prosecutions and
affirmed that conspiracy is not the same offense as the substantive crime
for double jeopardy purposes. Felix shows that the Court intended that
Grady should be narrowly interpreted; Grady does not hold that offering
evidence of misconduct in one prosecution bars a subsequent prosecu-
tion for that misconduct. The Felix decision put an end to the idea that
Grady requires a same evidence test. However, Felix does nothing to de-
fine the scope of the same conduct test that it affirms. Double jeopardy
analysis remains "enmeshed in .. .subtleties."'
154
CONCLUSION
Williams confirmed the reluctance of the Supreme Court to super-
vise the activities of grand juries, and made it clear that prosecutors
must fear only the threat of reprimands and sanctions by administrative
agencies, absent some action by Congress to prescribe limitations on
their behavior. Felix, by affirming a narrow interpretation of Grady, made
the prosecutor's task easier. Felix allows a more generous interpretation
of what evidence is admissible without jeopardizing subsequent prose-
cutions and ensures the separation of conspiracies and the substantive
crimes attached to them. Both decisions support the opinion that the
Court is joining in the efforts of other governmental powers in the war
on crime1 5 5 by eroding constitutional protections relied on by potential
151. Felix II, 926 F.2d at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1534 (stating that rule 404(b) will be "eviscerated" because the Tenth
Circuit's decision holds that introduction of prior bad act evidence to prove intent is the
same as prosecution for that bad act); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (the Court's decision "casts doubt on the continued vitality of Rule 404(b)");
Richardson, supra note 86, at 303-05 (if the Court chooses to interpret Grady narrowly, rule
404(b) will not be diluted).
153. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1382.
154. Id. at 1385. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 86; Thomas, supra note 87; So, supra
note 91, at 370-71. But seeJames M. Herrick, Note, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The
"Same Conduct" Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 847,866 (1990-91) ("[Grady] allevi-
ate[s] the confusion in [this] doctrinal area ....").
155. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.):
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
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Leslie P. Kramer
156. For instance, the narrow interpretation of Grady supported by the Felix decision
will prevent Grady from being applied in a RICO context. For a discussion of Grady's effect
on RICO criminal prosecutions, see Ramona L. McGee, Criminal RICO and Double Jeopardy
Analysis in the Wake of Grady v. Corbin: Is This RICO's Achilles Heel?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 687
(1992).
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